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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOHN MICHAEL HASSELBLAD, : Case No. 20020730-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial judge had a duty to instruct the jury on the lesser-related offense of 
receiving stolen property. The evidence supported that John was home at the time of the 
burglary and that he took possession of the VCR and portable stereo under suspicious 
circumstances. The only outstanding issue for this Court is whether the trial judge 
abused his discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense theory because the 
judge concluded that defense counsel untimely requested the jury instruction. The record 
indicates that the request may have been timely, defense counsel acted in good faith, and 
neither the State nor the trial judge were prejudiced by the request. In fact, as recent 
amendments to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 show, defense counsel's request at 
the close of the evidence was entirely appropriate. Further, even if defense counsel's 
proffered instruction incorrectly stated the law, the trial judge had a duty to instruct the 
jury on the applicable defense theory of receiving stolen property. 
I. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE 
DEFENSE THEORY THAT APPELLANT LIKELY 
KNEW THE PROPERTY WAS STOLEN, THE TRIAL 
JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON THE LESSER RELATED OFFENSE OF 
POSSESSING STOLEN PROPERTY 
The trial testimony rationally supported the defense theory that John knowingly 
possessed stolen property. Contrary to the State's claims, John never denied knowing 
that the VCR and portable stereo were stolen. To the contrary, the defense case appeared 
to be geared toward allowing the jury to infer that very fact. Because the evidence was 
consistent with the defense theory, the law on lesser related offenses required the trial 
judge to instruct the jury on the crime of receiving stolen property. 
Without conceding the issue, the State does not contest that receiving stolen 
property was a lesser-related offense to burglary in this case. State's Brief at 28. Instead, 
the State asserts that the trial judge properly refused to instruct the jury on that defense 
theory because John "denied complicity" in both the burglary charge and the receiving 
offense. kL The record contains no such denials. Even the State's own citations to the 
trial transcript show that John offered no specific testimony about his knowledge when 
he accepted the stolen equipment from Cherie, April, and David. State's Brief at 29 
(citing to R. 249: 79, 81-82). Although John admitted that when the police approached 
him he knew that the electronic equipment was stolen, he never addressed his 
understanding when he took the property. 
Rather, the entire defense strategy appears to have been to allow the jury decide 
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for itself whether John was an innocent victim or that he believed that his three friends 
had stolen the VCR and portable stereo. The law on lesser-related offenses only required 
John to show that "the evidence provides a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting'" on the lesser offense. State v. Hansen , 
734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Baker . 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983) 
(internal quotation omitted)). Here, the defense presented evidence that John was home 
at the time of the burglary, accepted the electronic equipment from persons who had 
recently stolen it, made no arrangements to return the items, and accepted the portable 
stereo even though it needed no repair. Then, John hid the items after receiving them 
from his friends. 
This evidence more than adequately supports the rational inference that John 
committed the crime of receiving stolen property. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. For 
purposes of this case, John committed a crime if he possessed the property "knowing" 
that it was stolen or "believing that it probably ha[d] been stolen." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-408( 1) (1999). * Utah law allows the trier of fact to presume a person possesses stolen 
'That statute provides in its entirety: 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of 
the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, 
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding 
the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
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property when, as here, the property has been recently stolen and "no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession is made.. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1999). 
The suspicious circumstances under which John accepted the stolen property established 
a reasonable belief that the property was stolen and, given the presumption above, may 
have even supported actual knowledge that Cherie, April, and David had taken the 
property and wanted John to store it for them. The "jury was not so limited in its 
permissible assessment of the evidence" to exclude the possibility that John knew or 
believed the property was stolen. State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (evidence consistent with defendant's testimony that he touched victim but did so 
without intent to inflict pain or gratify sexual desires). Because the evidence was 
"[consistent" with this defense theory, the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
on receiving stolen property. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 423. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is 
presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on 
a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding 
the receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or 
disposed, acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far 
below its reasonable value[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999). 
4 
II. BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL ACTED IN GOOD 
FAITH AND THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE 
LESSER-RELATED OFFENSE, THE TRIAL JUDGE 
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER OFFENSE 
Since the evidence supported the crime of receiving stolen property, the only 
remaining question for this Court addresses the trial judge's decision to penalize defense 
counsel for requesting a lesser-related offense instruction at the close of the evidence. 
The record shows that defense counsel innocently requested the instruction. Rejecting a 
lesser-related offense instruction simply because defense counsel misunderstood the trial 
judge's thinking constitutes an abuse of discretion. Moreover, neither the State nor the 
trial court suffered any prejudice based on the mid-trial request. In sum, no reasonable 
grounds supported denying the request. 
Regardless of the legal nuances addressed in this appeal, both John and the State 
agree that the trial judge had discretion whether to give the lesser-related offense 
instruction. Appellant's Brief at 36; State's Brief at 13 (both citing State v. Evans , 668 
P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983)). As discussed more fully in the opening brief, the record 
indicates that defense counsel may have even filed a timely request before trial. 
Appellant's Brief at 31-32. The State rejects this reading of the record and argues that 
defense counsel's statements show that he did not request the instruction until the close 
of the evidence. State's Brief at 13-15. The State ignores, however, the plausibility that 
defense counsel simply forgot about requesting the instruction at the pretrial conference 
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that occurred several months prior to trial. Given an average public defender's heavy 
case load and numerous clients, concluding that defense counsel did not remember his 
actions at the pretrial conference is a reasonable assumption. 
If, as the State maintains, defense counsel first requested the instruction during 
trial, even viewing defense counsel's actions in the worst possible light merely shows 
that he and the trial judge miscommunicated. Based on several years of experience in 
criminal law and his practice in the Third Judicial District Court, defense counsel 
honestly believed that the law allowed him to request a lesser included offense 
instruction at the close of the evidence. R. 250B: 2. Defense counsel also had no time to 
review jury instructions over the lunch recess because he had to teach a class. R. 249: 
42-43. Moreover, the trial judge specifically ruled before lunch that he and counsel 
would "have to spend some time on jury instructions at some point" later in the trial to 
finalize the instructions. R. 249: 42. 
These facts demonstrate that the trial judge and defense counsel simply 
misunderstood each other over when to offer proposed instructions. This innocent 
miscommunication does not justify depriving John of the right to instruct the jury on his 
theory of the case. That right "serves a fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find 
a defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between 
the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal." Hansen. 734 P.2d at 424. 
The trial judge's approach to this right belies his duty to "liberally construe!"]" requests 
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for lesser-related offense instructions. Id.; see also State v. Carruth, 1999 UT 107, ^|6, 
993 P.2d 869. 
The trial judge further abused his discretion because giving the instruction could 
have easily been accommodated. Although both the trial judge and the State complained 
that the request caught them off-guard, neither of them identified any hardship in this 
case. The trial judge complained that requests for a lesser-related offense instruction 
present difficult questions for trial judges. R. 249: 95. Even assuming the accuracy of 
this observation, the trial judge failed to explain why such decisions are more difficult 
than any other evidentiary ruling judges render during the course of a trial. Further, in 
this case, the trial judge had all of the information he needed to decide whether the law 
required the instruction. No continuance was needed. In fact, as amended Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 19 suggests, "the close of the evidence" is an ideal time to determine 
whether the evidence supports a lesser-related offense instruction. Utah R. Crim. P. 
19(b), (c) (2003). The trial judge's complaint had no application to this case 
Likewise, the prosecutor complained that requesting the instruction at the end of 
the evidence deprived the State of an opportunity to establish the value of the property 
taken. To the contrary, Ms. Rodriguez testified to the date she purchased the stolen items 
and their cost when she purchased them. R. 249: 17-18. Both items cost $200, while 
one was a month old and the other was a year old. Id. This evidence belies the 
prosecutor's complaints. Defense counsel's good-faith belief that he had timely 
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requested the instruction coupled with the absence of any prejudice resulting from the 
mid-trial request constituted an abuse of discretion. 
The State's apparent concern for surprise is unfounded because the State should 
be expected to prepare to prove the defendant's guilt on lesser offenses. Specifically, 
because the State bears the burden of proving guilt, it is charged with the duty to be ready 
to present evidence of guilt at trial. Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. Given this burden, the State 
cannot seriously argue that requests for lesser-related offenses will result in '"trial by 
ambush.'" State's Brief at 24-25 (quoting Jones v. State, 575 S.E.2d 456, 459 (Ga. 
2003)).2 In the rare event that an unforeseen request for an lesser offense instruction 
surprises the State, trial judges could re-open the prosecution's case at the close of the 
evidence. See State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d 600, 601 (Utah 1951) (prosecution can 
request to re-open case). 
Moreover, the trial judge acted capriciously in denying the requested instruction 
when the judge himself may have misled defense counsel into any possible error. The 
trial judge specifically stated that he would prepare the ,!propose[d]n instructions over the 
lunch recess and then "at some point" the parties would "have a discussion" about the 
instructions. R. 249: 42-43. The trial judge, thus, represented that the parties would 
have an opportunity to discuss jury instructions later in the day. Defense counsel then 
2The State's constitutionally-assigned burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt also distinguishes this case from the discretion afforded the trial judge in the civil 
cases. Schwartz v. Benzow, 2000 UT App 203 (memorandum decision). 
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relied on the representations that the trial judge had assumed responsibility for the 
instructions himself and that further discussions on jury instructions would follow later. 
To reject the defense's lesser-related offense instruction under these circumstances 
amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
The trial judge's actions distinguish this case from Evans. In that case, defense 
counsel remained silent "knowing" that the trial judge was preparing final instructions. 
Evans, 668 P.2d at 568. In contrast, here, the trial judge affirmatively represented that 
further discussions with counsel would take place before the judge would finalize jury 
instructions. In then denying the requested instruction, the trial judge deprived John of 
the right to "permit[] the jury to find a defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts, 
rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and an 
acquittal." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. This arbitrary action results in a "miscarriage[] of 
justice." Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Evans further has no application to this appeal because that case, unlike this 
appeal, involved the failure to preserve arguments for appellate review. 668 P.2d at 568, 
The State challenges this contention and argues that this Court should not consider the 
merits of the motion for new trial because the trial judge's decision rested on waiver for 
untimeliness and John "did nothing to cure his waiver under Evans.." State's Brief at 22 
The state overlooks, however, that in addition to ruling on the timeliness of the request, 
the trial judge addressed the merits of each of John's contentions both at trial and at the 
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hearing during which he denied the motion for a new trial. R. 249: 91-97: 250B: 13-18. 
This court has repeatedly ruled that "when a trial court considers the merits of an issue in 
a motion for new trial, the issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 
205,1J6 n.2, 29 P.3d 25; see also State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah), cert, denied 
510 U.S. 865 (1993) (addressing merits of appeal because trial court did so in absence of 
objection); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 2 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (excusing failure to 
object to supplemental jury instruction because trial court ruled on merits). Because 
defense counsel preserved the merits of this case in the motion for new trial, this case is 
distinguishable from Evans. 
The State correctly notes that the amendments to Rule 19 took effect one month 
after John's October 4, 2001, trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (2002) (amended effective 
November 1, 2001). Although the prior version of Rule 19 did not address the giving of 
instructions during the course of a trial, it appears to have accommodated for such 
practice. That version of the rule authorized trial judges to instruct the jury "[a]t the 
close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs... ." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 19(a) (2001) (emphasis added). As the amendments to Rule 19 demonstrate, 
mid-trial instructions are not only desirable but may even be necessary, such as here, to 
ensure a fair trial. As shown above, under any view of this case, the trial judge's refusal 
to give the lesser-related instruction cannot be viewed as a "reasonable" or proper use of 
discretion. Id 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT HAD A DUTY TO CORRECTLY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER OFFENSE 
The State argues that this Court should uphold the trial judge's decision because 
the proffered instruction on receiving stolen property "did not accurately define the 
applicable law." State's Brief at 30. Even assuming that the instruction did not correctly 
state the law, the trial judge had a duty to instruct the jury on receiving stolen property 
because the evidence rationally supported that offense. Carruth, 1999 UT 107, ^ |6, 993 
P.2d 869. Trial judges have an affirmative "duty to instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the facts of the case." State v. Squire. 888 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). Trial judges are not relieved of this duty because a proffered instruction 
incorrectly states the law. Rather, trial judges have a duty to correct the error and instruct 
the jury on the applicable law. Id. 
Ignoring the trial judges' duty to correctly instruct the jury, the State contends that 
this Court has outright rejected jury instructions that "'incorrectly state[] the law.'" 
State's Brief at 30 (quoting State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1J21, 52 P.3d 1210, cert, denied 
123 S. Ct. 999 (2003)). Apparently, according to the State, if a criminal defendant offers 
an incorrect instruction, the defendant forfeits the right to instruct the jury on the defense 
theory of the case. State's Brief at 30-31. This argument misconstrues the law on 
instructing juries. Trial judges, not parties, are bound to adequately instruct the jury on 
the law. Squire, 888 P.2d at 1104. If a reasonable basis appears in the evidence for a 
lesser-related offense instruction, trial judges have a duty to correctly instruct the jury on 
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the defense theory. Carruth, 1999 UT 107, ^ j6, 993 P.2d 869. The possibility that the 
defense's proffered jury instruction erroneously defined the crime of receiving stolen 
property meant that the trial judge should have drafted a correct instruction defining that 
offense. See, e.g.. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 179 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (trial judges 
can "easily" amend criminal information to conform to jury instructions). 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial judge erroneously refused to instruct the jury on a lesser related 
offense, John requests this Court to reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial. 
Dated this J3^ day of June, 2003. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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